A study by Iraqi analyst Iyad al-Annbar titled “Iraq in the Struggle for Power and Influence Between Iran and the United States” examines Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s efforts to preserve a fragile neutrality—maneuvering between the two powers amid regional tensions. The author emphasizes that U.S.-Iranian rivalry over Iraq is nothing new, but after 2003 it entered a new phase, when the overthrow of Saddam Hussein opened the way for Tehran’s growing political influence.
According to al-Annbar, the United States, after the invasion, had no clear plan, which allowed Iran to use the regime change to strengthen its security and expand its influence. At the same time, Tehran sought to keep Iraq in a “fragile” state by controlling it through “centers of power”—official and unofficial structures that both sustained uncertainty in relations with Washington and followed Iran’s agenda.
However, this model began to show cracks after the events of October 7, 2023, along with subsequent regional shifts that narrowed the room for maneuver for the “axis of resistance.” The most striking sign of this was the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. In addition, direct Iranian interference in Iraq’s internal affairs declined after the assassination of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in early 2020—since then, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has intervened less frequently in shaping governments and appointing officials.
Despite this, Iran retains multilayered levers of influence—not only military and political, but also social and symbolic. A case in point is Tehran’s insistence on holding the funeral of the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Najaf and Karbala—a gesture that underscores Tehran’s social and political weight more than its religious one. The message from Mojtaba Khamenei after the mourning ceremony, in which he called for “revenge” and said that “the free people of the world” would help, indicates that even if Tehran’s capabilities have weakened, it is not stepping away from its influence.
Changes have also taken place on the American side, especially after Donald Trump returned to the White House. Under Muhammad Shia al-Sudani, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad treated pro-Iranian forces as a political reality, but under Trump II the approach has become tougher: abandoning the law on “al-Hashd al-Shaabi,” preventing pro-Iranian factions from joining the government, appointing a special envoy, and rejecting Nouri al-Maliki’s candidacy for prime minister after the 2025 elections.
At the center of the new scheme is Ali al-Zaidi. Trump congratulated him on his appointment, wishing success to a “government free from terrorism,” and invited him to Washington. A businessman by background, al-Zaidi managed to carry his cabinet through “fine-tuning”: he met the U.S. demand not to include factions linked to armed groups in the first stage of the government, while leaving open the possibility for them to enter in the second stage. In the analyst’s view, this suggests that Iran has moved away from direct pressure—whereas earlier such appointments were dictated by Tehran.
Al-Zaidi’s pattern of actions—traveling between Washington and Tehran, attending Khamenei’s funeral, then a warm handshake with Trump at the White House, and afterward a return visit to Tehran—so far does not point to a fully formed strategy. Iraq has to operate within a hybrid security system torn by internal conflicts and open to outside interference, while Iran itself is divided between the Guard Corps and official diplomatic structures.
The study warns that the main challenge for al-Zaidi is not simply improving relations with both sides, but redefining Iraq’s place: instead of betting on becoming a “front line” against Iran, the focus should be on stability and the economy; relations with Tehran should be rebuilt after a possible end to the war. The key remains the “arms problem”—control over armed formations and economic networks, including mafia-like networks profiting from smuggling dollars and oil. Ultimately, turning Iraq from a theater of conflict into a point where interests intersect will require strengthening the domestic political system and refusing to play into outside forces—only then is the “Iraq first” course possible.
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- Who is Qassem Soleimani and why did his assassination in 2020 change Iran’s influence in Iraq? — Qassem Soleimani was the commander of the “Quds” forces within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), responsible for operations abroad. He coordinated networks of Iraqi militias loyal to Iran and had enormous influence in Iraq. His killing as a result of a U.S. airstrike on January 3, 2020, temporarily weakened coordination among Iran’s proxies, but it also triggered a backlash: the Iraqi parliament voted to withdraw American troops, and pro-Iranian groups increased pressure. In the long term, Iran’s influence remained, though it became less personalized.
- What is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and how does it preserve levers of influence in Iraq? — The IRGC is an elite military-political formation in Iran that reports to the supreme leader. It includes land, naval, and air forces, as well as the special unit “Quds.” In Iraq, the IRGC maintains influence through funding, training, and arming Iraqi Shiite militias (for example, “al-Hashd al-Shaabi”), as well as through economic ties and political support for loyal parties. The strategy of the “axis of resistance” allows Iran to use Iraq as a staging ground to pressure the United States and Israel.
- Why did the funeral of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei take place specifically in Najaf and Karbala, and what do these cities mean for Shiites? — Najaf and Karbala are sacred cities for Twelver Shiites. Najaf is home to the shrine of Imam Ali (the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad), while Karbala is home to the shrine of Imam Hussein (the grandson of the Prophet), who died a martyr’s death at the Battle of Karbala in 680. For Shiites, these are sites of religious pilgrimage and symbols of the struggle against injustice. Holding the funeral there (if it indeed occurred—Khamenei is still alive, but the question appears hypothetical) highlights the connection between the Iranian supreme leader and Shiite tradition, strengthening legitimacy among believers. (Note: Ali Khamenei is alive, so the reference may be to a future funeral scenario or to the symbolic meaning.)
- Who is Mojtaba Khamenei, and why is his message calling for “revenge” considered significant? — Mojtaba Khamenei is the second son of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and is seen as one of the possible successors to the leadership of the Islamic Revolution. He holds an influential position within the IRGC and the clerical establishment. His call for “revenge” (likely for the killing of Soleimani or for other strikes against Iran) is understood as a signal that even after a leadership change, a hard line toward the United States and Israel may persist, and that he intends to continue his father’s policy.
- What is the “axis of resistance,” and which Iraqi groups belong to it? — The “axis of resistance” is an informal alliance of forces led by Iran, united by opposition to Israel, the United States, and their allies in the Middle East. It includes Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Syria’s government, the Palestinian Hamas and “Islamic Jihad,” the Houthis in Yemen, as well as numerous Iraqi Shiite armed formations. Among the Iraqi groups in the axis are “Kataib Hezbollah,” “Asaib Ahl al-Haq,” the Badr Brigades, “Harakat al-Nujaba,” “Failak al-Waad as-Sadiq,” and others, unified under the umbrella structure of “al-Hashd al-Shaabi” (Popular Mobilization Forces).
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