The focus is on four highly secure military headquarters, presented here as symbols of preparations for a redistribution of global power. Two are in East Asia, a third in the heart of Europe, and the fourth in a city straddling two continents and bordered by two seas. Their locations and personnel, the author argues, help explain how major powers are taking on roles once reserved for Washington.
The argument draws on a long-running debate over the decline of American hegemony. In The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Paul Kennedy considered the weakening of the United States inevitable, and the task of statesmen to make the process gradual. In 2011, Stephen Walt wrote of the “death of the American era”: in his view, Washington had lost its ability to shape the world order alone because of the rise of independent powers, military setbacks, resource depletion, and mounting debt.
The article also lists more recent signs of waning influence. Trump’s arrival with the slogan “America First,” abrupt withdrawals from agreements and organizations, attacks on allies, and rapprochement with authoritarian leaders are cited as factors further weakening the United States. The article also points to UN votes on Gaza, where 162–167 countries backed Palestinian rights, leaving only seven states aligned with Washington and Israel; the wars with Iran in 2025–2026 described in the article; the killing of Ali Khamenei; Iranian missile strikes on American bases; adviser Tom Barrack’s admission that 23 attempts at regime change had failed to achieve their aims; the crisis triggered by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz; and Washington’s need to ask Moscow for help. Even Zelensky, according to the article, is thwarting a diesel deal with Putin—a sign that the United States is losing leverage even among its friends.
The first headquarters is in Tokyo’s Ichigaya district, on a hill near the Imperial Palace. Here, the article says, General Hiroaki Uchiura is drawing up a plan to return Japan to center stage as a military power. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has dodged questions about her commitment to the three non-nuclear principles; Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi has called for “a discussion without taboos” on nuclear weapons, and a senior official has said outright that the country should possess them.
Tokyo is backing its ambitions with money and technology: around $310 billion in military spending is planned for 2023–2027; the Izumo and Kaga helicopter carriers are being converted into aircraft carriers; Japan is expected to deploy 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles and develop Type 12 missiles with a range of more than 1,000 kilometers. Its armed forces number around 247,000 personnel, ranking seventh in the world. Experts cited in the article see a shift from “pure defense” to preemptive deterrence, underpinned by an economy worth more than $4.2 trillion and 45% of global industrial robot production.
The second headquarters is in Beijing’s August 1 Building, near Zhongnanhai and the Forbidden City. It is headed by Admiral Dong Jun, who has more than 45 years of naval service behind him. According to the article, China has more than two million service members, including over 900,000 in the ground forces; a defense budget of $275 billion in 2026; the world’s largest navy, with 470 ships, three aircraft carriers, 60 submarines, and hypersonic missiles with a range of more than 15,000 kilometers.
Beijing has warned Tokyo of a “crushing military defeat” if it intervenes by force in the Taiwan issue, in response to Takaichi’s remark that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could pose an “existential threat.” The article notes that China remembers its tragic history with Japan, but is pursuing primacy not only through military means, but also through its economy, supply chains, and the expansion of its defense arsenal.
The third headquarters is at the Bendlerblock complex in Berlin’s Tiergarten district, where General Carsten Breuer is watching Trump’s criticism of Europe and the cracks in the international order. Chancellor Friedrich Merz said that the era when Germany and Europe could automatically rely on the American security umbrella is irrevocably over, and set out the goal: Berlin must have power that others take seriously. A record defense budget of more than $124 billion has been approved for 2026, funding aircraft, air defenses, Leopard tanks, Puma and Boxer armored vehicles, ammunition, intelligence, space, and cyberspace; the armed forces number 181,000. An economy worth more than $5.4 trillion and low debt provide the resources, but Germany’s return to prominence is constrained by the time needed to rearm, the complexity of treaties, and the historical precedents of Bismarck and Hitler, both of whose projects ended in defeat in 1945.
The fourth headquarters is in Istanbul’s four-towered Selimiye Barracks in Üsküdar, from which the First Army has directed campaigns, conquests, and supply operations for centuries. General Bahtiyar Ersay has led it since August 2025. Turkey ranks ninth in the world, first in the Middle East, and second in NATO: it has around 480,000 active-duty personnel, 380,000 reservists, military spending of more than $44 billion, and locally produces over 80% of its equipment, including the TCG Anadolu drone carrier, the KAAN fighter, and the Bayraktar, Akıncı, and Anka drones. Erdoğan speaks of missions “from Syria to northern Iraq, from Libya to Somalia” and of heroes who have defended the homeland for almost a thousand years.
Turkey’s $1.6 trillion economy ranks eleventh in the world, but the article suggests this is offset by the absence of a document of surrender that might stand in the way of a new rise. As Dr. Ali al-Zahab notes, Ankara draws on an ancient military tradition and seeks entry into the club of great powers. Like Tokyo, Beijing, and Berlin, it is acting against a backdrop of declining trust in Washington and building more independent defense structures. The four headquarters thus become more than military facilities: they illustrate a shift toward a multipolar order in which powers are preparing to set the rules of force for themselves.
Comments on the Article
- Why are the Selimiye Barracks in Üsküdar considered the historic center of the First Army, and which campaigns of the 19th and 20th centuries shaped their symbolic significance? — The Selimiye Barracks, built under Selim III, became part of the Ottoman military modernization effort. During the Crimean War, they served as a hospital where Florence Nightingale worked; later, they were associated with mobilizations for the Balkan Wars, World War I, and the Turkish War of Independence. Today they are the headquarters of the First Army, making them a symbol of the defense of Istanbul and the straits, continuity from the Ottoman army to the republic, and control of the strategic entrance from the Sea of Marmara to the Black Sea.
- How does Turkey’s First Army, historically linked to the defense of Istanbul and the straits, relate to Ankara’s current cross-border operations in Syria and northern Iraq? — The two are not directly equivalent. The First Army is a territorial command responsible primarily for Istanbul, the straits, Thrace, and the northwest. Cross-border operations in Syria and northern Iraq are planned by the General Staff and the Land Forces, and are carried out mainly by the Second Army, special forces, the Air Force, and drones. The First Army may provide units, rotations, logistical support, and defense of the straits, but its historic mission—deterring threats to and protecting Istanbul—is not the same as commanding operations “from Syria to northern Iraq.”
- Who is General Bahtiyar Ersay, and what record of service or professional reputation underlies his appointment as commander of the First Army in August 2025? — Open sources do not confirm his appointment in August 2025 or provide a full service record for General Bahtiyar Ersay. Without official confirmation, it is not possible to describe his career and reputation reliably; this claim should therefore be checked against statements from Turkey’s Ministry of National Defense and the official appointments gazette.
- What does Ankara mean by the phrase “from Syria to northern Iraq,” and which Kurdish, border, or infrastructure issues does it associate with these areas? — The phrase describes what Ankara sees as a single zone of threats posed by the PKK and forces linked to it, stretching from Syrian areas controlled by the YPG/SDF to PKK bases in Qandil and Sinjar in northern Iraq. The associated concerns include border control and preventing a “corridor” along the Turkish-Syrian border, combating the smuggling of weapons and fighters, protecting border crossings and roads such as the M4, and safeguarding infrastructure—including border crossings, oil and gas facilities, water resources, and trade routes.
- How have the Bayraktar, Akıncı, and Anka drones changed the nature of operations in Syria, and why is their production considered an important part of Turkey’s military autonomy? — The TB2, Akıncı, and ANKA have given Ankara an affordable means of conducting long-duration surveillance, target acquisition, and precision strikes without risking crewed aircraft. In Syria, they have been used for surveillance, strikes against the PKK/YPG and regime forces, support for Turkey’s Syrian allies, and monitoring of operational zones. Turkey produces these platforms, sensors, and munitions domestically, reducing its dependence on the United States and other suppliers, strengthening its export leverage, and enabling operations despite restrictions on foreign equipment purchases.
- What is the TCG Anadolu as Turkey’s first drone carrier, and what missions could it perform off the Syrian coast or in the Eastern Mediterranean? — The TCG Anadolu is a landing helicopter dock (LHD) converted to operate drones, primarily the carrier-based version of the TB3 and, potentially in the future, the jet-powered Kızılelma. It carries helicopters, drones, landing craft, and troops. Off the Syrian coast and in the Eastern Mediterranean, it could conduct drone surveillance and strikes, support amphibious operations and special forces, carry out evacuations and humanitarian missions, show the flag, and deter adversaries. Its capabilities are limited, however, by the lack of carrier-based crewed aircraft and its reliance on the development of naval drones.
Full article: A history of invasions and broken borders: the four armies mobilizing to fill the American void