The 35-member Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) unanimously decided, without a formal vote, to close the case concerning Syria’s failure to meet its nuclear obligations. This revoked the status established by a 2011 decision. The Board expressed satisfaction with the cooperation of Syria’s new authorities, who granted inspectors access to key nuclear sites after a years-long investigation into the period when ousted President Bashar al-Assad was in power.
The decision was made possible by Damascus’s new policy: Syria declared its readiness to cooperate fully with the agency and disclosed previously undeclared sites. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi called the Syrian authorities’ decision to report one of these sites a courageous step. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco also supported the Arab initiative, calling for a final settlement of the issue and the abandonment of the term “non-compliance,” which had remained in place since the previous regime.
The Arab proposal provides for the launch of a new phase of peaceful technical cooperation between Syria and the IAEA, including the continuation of drilling work at the site in Deir ez-Zor. The agency noted Damascus’s unprecedented transparency, inspectors’ access and the transfer of discovered materials under international safeguards. Syria remains a party to the safeguards agreement and will undergo routine inspections, like other states that do not possess nuclear weapons.
The Syrian Atomic Energy Commission called the closure of the case a “strategic achievement,” reached through a year and a half of diplomatic and national efforts. Damascus believes the decision confirms the country’s right to use nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes—in medicine, agriculture and scientific research—and opens the way to grants, scholarships and exchanges of expertise. Recent inspections uncovered a reactor, nuclear fuel production facilities, a materials storage site, uranium scrap and approximately 73 tons of natural metallic uranium at Deir ez-Zor, which had been closed for 18 years, as well as at another previously undeclared site.
According to Grossi, during Assad’s rule Syria secretly built an almost completed reactor capable of producing materials suitable for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. In 2011, the IAEA linked the project to possible assistance from North Korea, while Israel acknowledged that it had struck the site in 2007. Russia welcomed the Board’s decision, saying it closed a 15-year-old case that lacked sufficient technical grounds. However, former IAEA inspections chief Robert Kelley noted the absence of evidence of a Syrian nuclear weapons program and suggested that the site may have been intended to produce plutonium for North Korea or a third party.
Comments on the News
What role did the Deir ez-Zor site play in the IAEA investigation, and why was it specifically linked to possible cooperation between Syria and North Korea? — The IAEA regarded the Deir ez-Zor site as a likely undeclared nuclear reactor that, in the agency’s assessment, may have been intended to produce plutonium. Its suspected design resembled North Korea’s reactor at Yongbyon, while reports of North Korean specialists’ presence heightened suspicions of technological cooperation. Israel destroyed the site in 2007; Syria denied that it had a nuclear purpose.
What does Syria’s continued safeguards agreement with the IAEA mean after the case was closed, and how do routine inspections differ from the regime in place since 2011? — Closing the specific investigation does not release Syria from its obligations under the safeguards agreement: Damascus must still declare its nuclear materials and facilities and allow IAEA inspectors access. Routine inspections are primarily intended to confirm that declared materials are not being used for military purposes. Since 2011, the IAEA had required Syria to engage in broader cooperation and provide access under a special decision by the Board of Governors, including inspections of undeclared sites and information concerning possible nuclear activities; the agency did not receive full access.
What consequences could the discovery of approximately 73 tons of natural metallic uranium have for international safeguards and Syria’s access to peaceful nuclear technologies? — This quantity of natural uranium does not in itself prove the existence of a nuclear weapons program, since natural uranium is not directly weapons-grade material. However, its origin, location and possible use require explanations and could reveal gaps in Syria’s accounting of nuclear materials. This may lead to stronger inspection requirements and make it more difficult to restore confidence in Syria. In practice, political restrictions and sanctions could limit Damascus’s access to peaceful nuclear technologies, even if the safeguards agreement formally remains in force.
Full version: After two decades: How did the IAEA close Syria’s nuclear file?