The purchasing power of Syrian families has fallen significantly in recent months: the gap between wages and the cost of living is widening, fuel is getting more expensive, and local production remains weak. As a result, even meeting basic needs—food, housing, transport and medicine—has become a struggle for many households, while constant efforts to save are changing their way of life.
Against this backdrop, Syria’s economy presents a mixed picture. Official forecasts promise growth of more than 10%, driven by recovery, the reopening of financial markets and the easing of international restrictions. Finance Minister Muhammad Yusr Barnieh expects growth of 11.3% this year and 9.7% in 2027, with many industries returning to their pre-2011 levels by 2030. The IMF is also forecasting double-digit growth. But these figures sit uneasily with daily life: since May 2026, the minimum wage has been 12,560 Syrian pounds a month—about $103 at the official exchange rate and less than $90 on the parallel market. Some public-sector employees have received a 50% pay increase, while pensions have risen by 30%.
Economist Abdel Karim Mahmoud says families’ purchasing power has improved only slightly when measured against the minimum wage, which is still not enough to cover basic needs. According to the World Food Programme, the minimum food basket for a family of five cost 26,551 pounds in June. The minimum wage covers only 47% of that amount, leaving a family to find around 14,000 pounds more—53% of the cost.
Poverty remains widespread. Expert Fadi Ayyash estimates the overall poverty rate at 80–90% and unemployment at over 50%. The Qasioun index puts the minimum monthly cost of living for a family of five at around 79,000 pounds. The official minimum wage covers just 9.8% of basic needs, while UNDP says that nine out of ten people in Syria live in poverty.
Academic and economist Ziad Ayoub Arbash identifies three forces undermining purchasing power. The first is the erosion of real wages under a system of “income in pounds, prices in dollars.” The second is a shift in the consumer basket, with protein being replaced by cheap carbohydrates. The third is reliance on money sent from abroad, aid and the sale of assets. Many families bridge the gap between income and expenses by taking on debt, eating less and going without essentials. Three interconnected deficits—a balance-of-payments deficit, a budget deficit and a gap between income and the cost of living—are also driving migration, child labor and school dropouts.
Analyst Radwan al-Dabs notes that it is difficult to speak of a single average household income or expenditure: there has been no recent comprehensive survey, and conditions vary widely by province, social group and source of income. The main problem, he says, is not only high prices but low incomes relative to the cost of living. Nominal wage increases do little good if prices rise faster. High energy, transport and logistics costs, along with the exchange rate, limit access to goods, while rent, commuting, electricity, education and healthcare consume much of the family budget. In September, the Ministry of Energy raised fuel prices: 95-octane gasoline rose from 152 to 195 pounds per liter, 90-octane gasoline to 185, and diesel from 125 to 175.
To address the situation, Ayyash proposes shifting from a restrictive monetary policy to a development-oriented one. This would mean overhauling social protections and replacing traditional commodity subsidies—which are vulnerable to losses and corruption—with targeted cash transfers for vulnerable groups. These could be funded in part by revenue from reviving the oil and gas sector, with assistance linked to vocational training and programs to expand opportunities. The diaspora, moreover, should be seen not as an emergency “safety net,” but as a source of sustainable investment through funds for infrastructure and support for small and medium-sized businesses.
Arbash warns that investment will not close the trade deficit overnight; the process will take years. Much of the investment also goes into real estate and services rather than labor-intensive production. In his view, economic liberalization has made it easier to import goods but has raised their dollar-denominated prices. He calls for narrowing the budget deficit through tax reform and cuts to unproductive spending, and reducing the balance-of-payments deficit by supporting exports and import-substituting production.
Mahmoud emphasizes that economic growth will benefit families only if demand for labor expands, wages rise alongside productivity, and local production develops. He estimates that government revenue will reach around $8 billion this year, compared with $3.5 billion in 2025, and says the money could be spent on wages, services and social protection. However, sharp wage increases funded through deficits risk accelerating inflation. Instead, he argues, funding should go to agriculture, food processing and small businesses, while reducing energy and transport costs for producers.
Comments on the News
What is the Qasioun index, and why is the minimum cost of living for a family calculated using it much higher than the WFP’s minimum consumer basket? — Qasioun is generally an independent cost-of-living estimate or market basket that assesses a Syrian family’s minimum expenses for a full range of goods and services: food, rent, utilities, fuel, transport, communications, clothing, healthcare, education and more. The WFP basket is a humanitarian benchmark for basic survival, often narrower in scope and based on different assumptions about calorie needs, household size and prices. That is why the Qasioun figure is higher: it is closer to the real cost of living than to a minimum aid package.
Why do Syria’s official and parallel exchange rates for the Syrian pound differ so widely, and how does this affect the real purchasing power of wages? — The Central Bank maintains the official rate, which is available only for limited transactions. The parallel rate reflects market demand for dollars amid foreign-currency shortages, sanctions, trade imbalances, dollarization and a lack of confidence in the pound. Most prices, especially for imports, fuel and energy, are tied to the parallel rate. As a result, a wage paid in pounds—particularly a public-sector wage—looks higher when converted at the official rate than its real purchasing power warrants. Its purchasing power is determined by the parallel rate and inflation.
Which international sanctions and restrictions apply to Syria, and how could their potential easing affect economic growth forecasts? — The main restrictions include US sanctions, including the Caesar Act and OFAC lists; EU financial, oil, investment, personal and transport sanctions; targeted UN sanctions; and measures imposed by the UK, Canada, Switzerland and Australia. These restrictions hinder bank transfers, investment, oil and gas exports, reconstruction and insurance. Easing them could improve growth prospects by boosting trade and investment, enabling repairs to the energy sector, reopening banking channels and facilitating remittances. The impact, however, will depend on security, governance and infrastructure.
What role does the oil and gas sector play in Syrian government revenue, and why is its recovery seen as a way to fund targeted social payments? — Before the war, oil and gas accounted for a significant share of export earnings and government revenue. After 2011, production fell sharply because of fighting, sanctions, damaged infrastructure, loss of control over oil fields and a lack of investment. Reviving the sector could increase government revenue through royalties, taxes and exports, reduce the cost of importing fuel and strengthen the energy system. This could create fiscal space for targeted cash payments instead of universal subsidies, provided revenues are managed transparently and subject to oversight.
How do remittances from the Syrian diaspora differ from other sources of household income, and why do experts suggest investing them in infrastructure and small businesses rather than using them for current consumption? — Diaspora remittances are private, often informal, family-to-family transfers sent directly to households. They are less dependent on government budgets and help families weather crises. They differ from wages, aid and oil and gas revenue. If spent only on consumption and imports, remittances can fuel inflation and dependence on external supplies without creating jobs. Experts propose channels for investment in infrastructure and small businesses to turn remittances into productive capital, but that requires trust, legal safeguards and access to banking and investment mechanisms.
Full version: Wages rose and economic growth accelerated. Why is Syrians’ purchasing power falling?